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by 
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I: Scope of Comment 
T he subject discussed in this comment-peacetime use of force on the high seas against foreign vessels-is approached rather gingerly in 
Chapter 3 of The Commander}s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. The 
main thrust of the chapter is to protect United States persons and property 
at sea by U.S. naval forces in peacetime against actions by pirates, terrorists 
or insurgents, and against the hazards of the sea, such as storms or mechanical 
failure. But the chapter deals also with such topics as transport of slaves, 
international narcotics traffic and unauthorized broadcasting from 
international waters; it also deals with the right of U.S. warships to approach 
and visit vessels sailing on the high seas under a foreign flag if suspected of 
such activities or in other special circumstances. 
In the case of the transport of slaves, no direct guidance is given; if 
confronted with such situation, "commanders should request guidance from 
higher authority." Similar advice is given in the case of unauthorized 
broadcasting. In both cases also it is noted (in paragraph 3.8) that the vessel 
may be approached, stopped and boarded, and the ship's documents examined, 
in order to verify its nationality. There the advice stops, and nothing is said 
about possible search and seizure. While the last sentence of paragraph 3.8 
suggests that the procedure for exercising the right of approach and visit is 
similar to that used in exercising the belligerent right of visit and search, 
it is not clear whether this statement applies only to "stateless vessels" with 
which it is linked in a separate subparagraph, or also to other suspected vessels. 
It is quite obvious, on the other hand, that the belligerent and peacetime 
situations are quite different, and throughout history the United States has 
strongly opposed this analogy (as will be documented later in this comment). 
The issue of suppression of international narcotics traffic is even more 
puzzling, as that traffic is not mentioned at all in paragraph 3.8, which lists 
the only situations in which approach and boarding of foreign vessels were 
allowed. Reliance is placed instead on "bilateral arrangements" (paragraph 
3.6), or "Congressional direction" and "consent" of the foreign flag nation, 
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granted by a bilateral agreement or ad hoc for the particular occasion 
(paragraph 3.12.4). There seems to be admission here that there is no general 
rule of international law authorizing such action, especially if the action 
envisaged here should extend beyond approach and visit, including even 
arrest, search and seizure. 
It might be useful to the commander on the spot, as well as the "higher 
authority" which is supposed to provide him with guidance, to explain the 
history of the two main efforts to authorize warships to visit, search, and, 
if justified, seize the vessels of other nations, and the reasons for the opposition 
of some major powers, including for a long time the United States and even 
today France, to this "strengthening" of the law and of the means to enforce 
it. This comment will thus discuss primarily the efforts to strengthen the 
control over transport of slaves and international narcotics traffic, with only 
incidental references to piracy (where international law developed detailed 
rules, which are generally accepted) and to the limited and by now mostly 
obsolete arrangements for stopping the smuggling of alcoholic beverages into 
the United States. 
Since its early ~ays, the principle of the freedom of the high seas has been 
subjected to a two-pronged attack: the efforts of some coastal states to extend 
their jurisdiction far into the sea, and the assertion by some naval powers 
of the right to ~xercise jurisdiction over the vessels of other states navigating 
on the high seas. While the first attack has led to a dramatic diminution of 
the area of the high seas, the second attack has led to such strong resistance 
that it resulted in only minor inroads on the freedom of navigation of the 
high seas. Nevertheless, in the last years of the twentieth century, after 
stopping repeated attempts to subject foreign vessels on the high seas to search 
and seizure in the name of abolishing the universally condemned slave trade 
(which unfortunately still exists under different guises), a new danger to the 
freedom of navigation on the high seas has arisen from unilateral attempts 
to enforce national legislation on the high seas in an area almost as odious-
traffic in narcotic drugs. In view of this development, it seems useful to 
explore the reasons for the persistence of the original opposition to such 
encroachments on the freedom of the seas, to consider the applicability of 
these arguments to the current situation, and to suggest some means to 
overcome the difficulties.1 As this subject is still too- vast, this comment is 
necessarily limited to a discussion of only some of the rules of international 
law which relate to the activities of naval vessels on the high seas in time 
of peace, authorizing some and prohibiting others.2 
II. Crusade Against Slave Trade 
The essence of the great principle of the freedom of the seas is that all ' 
nations have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the high seas for their 
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navigation. From this principle flow two additional principles: that a ship 
on the high seas is subject only to the jurisdiction of the state whose flag 
it flies and that no state has the right to interfere in any manner with vessels 
of other states navigating upon the high seas in time of peace. Even in time 
of war the right to visit, search or seize a neutral vessel has important limits, 
and the state exceeding these limits must pay compensation to the neutral 
state for any loss or damage caused to the vessel, its owner, crew, or cargo; 
even more, freedom of navigation must be observed in time of peace, and 
the violator must pay compensation proportional not only to the damage and 
loss, but also to the gravity of the violation.3 
These rules have been recognized for at least two hundred years. For 
instance, in the often quoted statement in the 1817 Le Louis case, the eminent 
British Admiralty judge, Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell), explained 
these principles in the following manner: 
Upon the first question, whether the right of search exists in time of peace, I have to 
observe that two principles of public law are generally recognized as fundamental. One 
is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude 
creates no distinction of right; ... and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere 
usurpation. This is the great foundation of public law, which ... mainly concerns the 
peace of mankind, both in their public and private capacities, to [be] preserve[d] 
inviolate. The second is, the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean 
for their navigation. In places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of 
all states meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state, or any 
of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another. 
I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the navigation of states 
in amity upon the high seas, excepting that which the rights of war give to both 
belligerents against neutrals. This right, incommodious as its exercise may occasionally 
be to those who are subjected to it, has been fully established in the legal practice of 
nations, having for its foundation the necessities of self-defence, in preventing the enemy 
from being supplied with the instruments of war, and from having his means of 
annoyance augmented by the advantages of maritime commerce. Against the property 
of his enemy each belligerent has the extreme rights of war. Against that of neutrals, 
the friends of both, each has the right of visitation and search, and of pursuing an inquiry 
whether they are employed in the service of his enemy, the right being subject, in almost 
all cases of an inquiry wrongfully pursued, to a compensation in costs and damages.4 
A 1950 memorandum prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations 
for the International Law Commission, after examining the pretensions of 
various nations to claim dominion over vast areas of the sea, concluded that 
the concept of the freedom of the seas which was developed to counteract 
these claims means not only that every nation has an equal right to use the 
high seas, but also that ships flying the flag of one state are prohibited from 
interfering with ships flying the flags of other nationalities. The memorandum 
pointed out that: 
Such interference, which is naturally forbidden in the mutual relations of users, is not 
even tolerated in the case of warships, which might be considered to have as their general 
mission to watch over the maintenance of order and security at sea. In peace-time 
warships have no police powers except over private vessels Hying their own flag. The 
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general policy powers of warships on the high seas in respect of private foreign vessels 
are limited to the right of approach, and do not comprise the right to check nationality 
by examination of ships' papers. The only exception to this rule is in the case of grave 
suspicion, and the State to which the investigating warship belongs is responsible for 
any damage caused by an examination that proves to be unwarranted. A warship which 
considers it necessary to interfere in this way with the navigation of a ship flying a 
flag other than its own, assumes, and thereby involves the State to which it belongs 
in, full responsibility for the action taken and for any possible damages.5 
In his opening statement to the 1958 Conference on the Sea, Admiral 
Oswald S. Colclaugh called attention to the fact that the United States "had 
often had to defend itself against the infringements of the principle [of the 
freedom of the seas]," and that, therefore, it "attached great importance to 
. "6 It. 
A dispute arose as early as the 1790s between the United States and Great 
Britain with respect to the British practice of stopping foreign vessels, 
including the American ones on the high seas, and removing sailors considered 
by the British to be still British subjects although they were naturalized 
abroad. This British abuse of the right of visit and search was one of the reasons 
for the War of 1812, and although this practice was in fact abandoned soon 
thereafter, the United States continued to raise the issue for some thirtyyears.7 
The American objections were spelled out in 1823 by John Quincy Adams, 
then Secretary of State: 
[T]he United States have never disputed the belligerent right of search, as recognized 
and universally practiced conformably to the laws of nations. They have disputed the 
right of belligerents, under colour of the right of search for contraband of war, to seize 
and carry away men, at the discretion of the boarding officer, without trial and without 
appeal; men, not as contraband of war or belonging to the enemy, but as subjects, real 
or pretended, of the belligerent himself, and to be used by him against his enemy. It 
is the fraudulent abuse of the right of search for purposes never recognized or admitted 
by the laws of nations; purposes in their practical operation of the deepest oppression 
and most crying injustice, that the United States have resisted and will resist, and which 
warns them against assenting to the extension in time of peace, of a right which 
experience has shown to be liable to such gross perversion in time of war.8 
The matter was only settled by an exchange of notes made in connection 
with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842.9 
When in 1807 the British Parliament prohibited slave trade by British 
citizens,10 the British Government embarked on a crusade to stop this trade 
also by citizens of other countries. Remembering the difficulties about the 
impressment of seamen, the United States-though in 1807 it also prohibited 
importation of slaves into the United Statesll-refused to concede to the 
British Navy the right to visit and search vessels under the United States flag. 
While British courts approved searches and seizures of American vessels 
during the Napoleonic wars,12 Sir William Scott had to consider the seizure 
in peacetime of Le Louis-mentioned above-which involved a French vessel, 
condemned by the British admiralty court at Sierra Leone on the grounds 
that it was equipped for carrying slaves, that it resisted the capture, and that 
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in the process it "piratically killed" eight members of the crew of the British 
cruiser. Sir William held that slave trade was not piracy nor a generally 
accepted crime under the law of nations, and that its illegality under the laws 
of both England and France was not a sufficient ground for the vessel's seizure. 
He started with the premise that neither a British act of parliament, nor any 
commission founded on it, can effect any right or interest of foreigners unless 
they are founded upon principles and impose regulations that are consistent 
with the law of nations. While a state has the "right to see that its own vessels 
are duly navigated," it has no right "to visit and search all the apparent vessels 
of other countries on the high seas, in order to institute an inquiry whether 
they are not in truth British vessels violating British laws." He added that 
a state should not make regulations which it "cannot enforce without 
trespassing on the rights of others." He emphasized that 
[t]o press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle 
that stands in the way of its establishment; to force the way to the liberation of Africa 
by trampling on the independence of other states in Europe; in short, to procure an 
eminent good by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as 
to public justice. 
If a country should agree by convention to allow visit and search in time 
of peace, it would be "for the prudence of states to regulate by that convention 
the exercise of the right with all the softenings of which it is capable," and 
to make sure that it would be "so constructed as not to excite just irritation." 
He pointed out, finally, that France rejected a proposed treaty permitting 
search on a reciprocal basis, "upon the express ground that she would not 
tolerate any maritime police to be exercised on her subjects but by herself. "13 
After the British Government concluded treaties with Spain, Portugal and 
the Netherlands allowing, on a reciprocal basis, search and seizure of vessels 
and adjudication by a mixed commission, the United States rejected a similar 
treaty. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, claimed that in 
accordance with this plan, citizens of the United States would be liable 
in time of peace to have their vessels searched and with their persons seized and carried 
away by the naval officer of a foreign power, subjected to the decision of a tribunal 
in a foreign land, without benefit of the intervention of a jury of accusation or of a 
jury of trial, by a court of judges and umpires half of whom would be foreigners and 
all irresponsible to the supreme authorities of the United States.14 
On another occasion, Mr. Adams made clear, however, that 
although Great Britain ... may be willing to abandon those of her subjects who defy 
the laws and tarnish the character of their country by participating in this trade to the 
dispensation of justice even by foreign hands, the United States are bound to remember 
that the power which enables a court to try the gnilty authorizes them also to pronounce 
upon the fate of the innocent and the very question of guilt or innocence is that which 
the protecting care of their Constitution has reserved for citizens of this Union to the 
exclusive decision of their own countrymen. This principle has not been departed from 
by the statute which has branded the slave trader with the name, and doomed him to 
the punishment, of a pirate. The distinction between piracy by the law of nations and 
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piracy by statute is well known and understood in Great Britain; and while the former 
subjects the transgressor guilty of it to the jurisdiction of any and every country into 
which he may be brought or wherein he may be taken, the latter forms a part of the 
municipal criminal code of the country where it is enacted and can be tried only by 
its own courts. 
At that time, Mr. Adams explained also, with real passion, that the United 
States had even more basic objections to the whole idea of search and seizure. 
He noted that: 
[T]he nature of the right of search at sea ... , as recognized or tolerated by the usage 
of nations, is a right exclusively of war, never exercised but by an outrage upon the 
rights of peace. It is an act analogous to that of searching the dwelling-houses of 
individuals on the land. The vessel of the navigator is his dwelling-house, and like that, 
in the sentiment of every people that cherishes the blessings of personal liberty and 
security, ought to be a sanctuary inviolable to the hand of power, unless upon the most 
unequivocal public necessity, and under the most rigorous personal responsibility of the 
intruder. Search at sea, as recognized by all maritime nations, is confmed to the single 
object of finding and taking contraband of war. By the law of nature, when two nations 
conflict together in war, a third, remaining neutral, retains all its rights of peace and 
friendly intercourse with both. Each belligerent, indeed, acquires by war the right of 
preventing a third party from administering to his enemy the direct and immediate 
materials of war; and, as incidental to this right, that of searching the merchant vessels 
of the neutral on the high seas to fmd them. Even thus limited, it is an act of power 
which nothing but necessity can justify, inasmuch as it cannot be exercised but by 
carrying the evils of war into the abodes of peace, and by visiting the innocent with 
some of the penalties of guilt. Among the modern maritime nations, an usage has crept 
in, not founded upon the law of nature, never universally admitted, often successfully 
resisted, and against which all have occasionally borne testimony by renouncing it in 
treaties, of extending this practice of search and seizure to all the property of the enemy 
in the vessel of the friend. This practice was, in its origin, evidently an abusive and 
wrongful extension of the search for contraband: effected by the belligerent, because 
he was armed; submitted to by the neutral, because he was defenseless; and acquiesced 
in by his sovereign for the sake of preserving a remnant of peace, rather than become 
himself a party to the war. Having thus, occasionally, been practiced by all as 
belligerents, and submitted to by all as neutrals, it has acquired the force of an usage 
which, at the occurrence of every war, the belligerent may enforce or relinquish, and 
which the neutral may suffer or resist, at their respective options. 
This search for and seizure of the property of an enemy in the vessel of a friend is 
a relic of the barbarous warfare of barbarous ages-the cruel and, for the most part, 
now exploded system of private war. As it concerns the enemy himself, it is inconsistent 
with ~hat mitigated usage of modern wars which respects the private property of 
individuals on the land. As relates to the neutral, it is a violation of his natural right 
to pursue, unmolested, his peaceful commercial intercourse with his friend. Invidious 
as is its character in both these aspects it has other essential characteristics equally 
obnoxious. It is an uncontrolled exercise of authority by a man in arms over a man 
without defense-by an officer of one nation over the citizen of another-by a man 
intent upon the annoyance of his enemy, responsible for the act of search to no tribunal, 
and always prompted to balance the disappointment of a fruitless search by the abusive 
exercise of his power, and to punish the neutral for the very clearness of his neutrality. 
It has, in short, all the features of unbridled power, stimulated by hostile and unsocial 
passions. 
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I forbear to enlarge upon the further extension of this practice by referring to injuries 
which the United States experienced when neutral in a case of vital importance; because, 
in digesting a plan for the attainment of an object which both nations have equally at 
heart, it is desirable to avoid every topic which may excite painful sensations on either 
side. I have adverted to the interest in question from necessity, it being one which could 
not be lost sight of in the present discussion. 
Such being the view taken on the right of search, as recognized by the law of nations 
and exercised by belligerent powers, it is due to candor to state that my Government 
has an insuperable objection to its extension by treaty, in any manner whatever, lest 
it might lead to consequences still more injurious to the United States, and especially 
in the circumstance alluded to. That the proposed extension will operate in time of 
peace and derive its sanction from compact present no inducements to its adoption. On 
the contrary, they form strong objections to it. Every extension of the right of search 
on the principles of that right is disapproved. If the freedom of the sea is abridged by 
compact for any new purpose the example may lead to other changes. And ifits operation 
is extended to a time of peace, as well as of war, a new system will be commenced 
for the dominion of the sea, which may eventually, especially by the abuses into which 
it may lead, confound all distinction of time and circumstances, of peace and of war, 
and of rights applicable to each state.I5 
In 1824, a British-American treaty was drafted based on a proposal made 
by then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who took into account the 
fact that both countries had enacted laws declaring the slave trade to be piracy 
punishable by death,16 as well as a resolution of the United States Congress 
requesting the President to conduct negotiations leading to the ultimate 
denunciation of the slave trade "as piracy under the law of nations, by the 
consent of the civilized world. "17 
The 1824 Treaty declared that the right to visit and search, reciprocally 
conceded, is wholly and exclusively founded on the consideration that the 
two nations have by their laws made the slave trade piracy, and that each 
power shall use its influence with all other civilized powers, to procure from 
them the acknowledgement that the slave trade is piracy under the law of 
nations. To remove United States objections to foreign adjudication the treaty 
also provided that a slave trading vessel of one country captured by the naval 
vessel of the other should be delivered to a port of the captured vessel's own 
country for adjudication.1s The Senate circumscribed its consent to 
ratification with several amendments cutting down United States obligations; 
these amendments were rejected by the British Government, and the treaty 
had to be abandoned.19 
After this attempt to find a compromise came to naught, the situation 
deteriorated. In 1839, the British Parliament enacted a law which was 
primarily directed against Portuguese vessels, but also applied to vessels "not 
being justly entitled to claim the protection of the flag of any state or 
nation."2O It authorized their visit to ascertain their nationality; seizing them 
not only when slaves were found on board but also if they were equipped 
for slave trade (e.g., carrying shackles, handcuffs, extra food and water, and 
large boilers for mass cooking); bringing them for adjudication as if they were 
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the property of British subjects; granting a bonus ("indemnity") to all persons 
concerned in their capture; and protecting the captors from any suit against 
them in a British court.21 
When this bill was presented to the House of Lords, the Duke of 
Wellington, the great British hero who defeated Napoleon in the Battle of 
Waterloo, opposed the bill regardless of its laudable objective. He reminded 
the lords that "the greatest judge who ever presided over an Admiralty 
Court" (Lord Stowell) had laid down in the Le Louis case that in peacetime 
even the right of search was illegal and contrary to the law of nations, unless 
that right had been conceded by treaty. If British cruisers should start stopping 
and searching suspicious ships of other nations, whether a treaty existed or 
not, as they had already started doing in relation to some foreign flag ships, 
other nations might soon resist or retaliate, and there would be a grave danger 
of universal war.22 Wellington's view prevailed, and the House of Lords 
rejected the bill; it was, however, adopted on the second reading, after the 
Government made sufficient changes in the bill to persuade enough lords to 
accept it.23 
In 1840, the British Government informed the United States that it could 
not allow foreign vessels to protect themselves by a fraudulent use of the 
American flag, and instructed the Admiralty to board American flag vessels 
suspected of being non-American for the restricted purpose of examining their 
papers and ascertaining whether they were actually entitled to display the 
American flag. If these papers were in order, the vessel would have to be 
immediately released; if they were not in order, it would be permissible to 
search the vessel; and if it had slaves on board or was equipped for slave 
trading, it would have to be detained and sent to the appropriate port for 
trial. The Admiralty's orders made it clear that American vessels must be 
shown every possible courtesy when boarded, but no one should be allowed 
to refuse inspection, and force might be used if necessary.:zlI 
After the United States protested the boarding of American flag vessels, 
Lord Palmers ton, the British Foreign Secretary, explained that "the right 
existed of ascertaining in some way or another the character of the vessel, 
and that by her papers and not the colours on flag, which might be displayed, " 
and that such inspection of papers "could not be regarded as amounting to 
a right of search." In reply, the United States ambassador, Mr. Stevenson, 
made clear that "under no circumstances could the government of the United 
States consent to the exercise of the right on the part of any foreign nations, 
to interrupt, board, or search their vessels on the high seas." He added that 
"to admit the right of a foreign naval officer, to decide upon the genuineness 
of American vessels, by boarding them . . . was in effect allowing the right 
of search, and therefore utterly indefensible. "25 
The difference of views on the right of visit was ingeniously papered over 
in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which dealt with a number of 
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important British-American disputes. It provided for sending two squadrons, 
one British and one American, to West Africa to suppress, separately but 
in concert and cooperation, the slave trade.26 It was understood that the main 
duty of the American squadron would be to ascertain, in case of doubt, the 
right of a vessel to display the American flag, and thus to avoid its visit by 
a British warship.27 
In order to avoid further conflict, the British Admiralty issued the 
following instructions to the Navy: 
The Slave Trade has been denounced by all the civilized world as repugnant to every 
principle of justice and humanity. You are, however, to bear in mind, that Great Britain 
claims no rights whatever with respect to foreign ships engaged in that traffic, excepting 
such as the Law of Nations warrants, or as she possesses by special Treaties and 
Conventions with particular states. 
It is your duty to make yourself thoroughly conversant with the Treaties, Conventions, 
and Laws, as well as with all the Instructions given to you relative to the Slave Trade. 
You are not to visit a vessel under a Foreign flag on the High Seas on suspicion of 
the Slave Trade, except in virtue of special authority under Treaty, or in case you have 
reason to believe that the vessel has no right to title to claim the protection of the flag 
she bears ... 
Towards every functionary, British or Foreign, with whom you may come in contact, 
you will invariably maintain a respectful and courteous demeanour. 
You will take special care to ensure propriety of language and demeanour on the 
part of officers, seamen and marines, towards all persons (officers being held responsible 
for any 'exhibition of intemperance' on the part of those under their command}.28 
Nevertheless, other incidents occurred, and in 1852 Secretary of State Cass 
reopened the controversy by notifying the British Government that the 
United States denied "the right of cruisers of any other power whatever, 
for any purpose whatever, to enter their vessels by force in time of 
peace .... No change of name can change the illegal character of the 
assumption. Search, or visit, it is equally an assault upon the independence 
of nations. "29 When the British Government asked the law officers of the 
Crown for their opinion on this subject, they responded that the United States 
was right in its interpretation of international law, and that an American 
vessel could be boarded by British officers only at their own risk. 
Consequently, British cruisers were ordered "to respect the American flag 
under any circumstances."30 
President Lincoln, upon taking office, immediately authorized Secretary 
of State Seward to start negotiations with the British Government on a 
convention to suppress the slave trade. These negotiations terminated in April 
of 1862 by the conclusions of a detailed convention, which authorized the 
ships of the two navies to "visit such merchant vessels of the two nations 
as may, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the African 
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Slave Trade, or having been fitted for that purpose; or of having, during the 
voyage on which they are met by the said cruisers, been engaged in the 
American Slave Trade, contrary to the provisions of this Treaty. " The means 
of the search were carefully specified in the treaty, and it was made clear 
that "the only object of the search is to ascertain whether the vessel is 
employed in African Slave Trade, or is fitted up for the said Trade." The 
right to search was originally limited to the distance of 200 miles from the 
coast of Africa, southward of the 32nd parallel of north latitude, and within 
30 leagues of the coast of Cuba; later it was extended to the area within 30 
leagues of Madagascar, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. 
The two governments agreed to establish three Mixed Courts of Justice, 
formed of an equal number of individuals from both countries; their seats 
were to be at Sierra Leone, Cape of Good Hope and New York. Each captured 
ship was to be brought before one of these courts and, if condemned, was 
to be broken up (to avoid its later sale to another slave trader); the master 
and crew of any condemned vessel were to be punished according to the laws 
of the country to which such vessel belonged, and should ordinarily be 
delivered for the execution of that punishment to the nation under whose 
flag the condemned vessel was sailing; and punishment was also to be meted 
to the owners of the condemned vessel and the persons interested in her 
equipment or cargo unless they should be able to prove that they had no 
participation in the enterprise. The enslaved Africans found on board of a 
condemned vessel were to be placed at the disposal of the Government whose 
cruiser had made the capture; they were to be set free immediately, the 
Government to whom they had been delivered guaranteeing their liberty. 
Should the Mixed Court of Justice decide, however, that the cruiser was guilty 
of an arbitrary and illegal detention, the cruiser's Government would be 
obligated to make good any losses suffered by the subjects or citizens of the 
other country, such indemnification to be paid within one year from the 
Court's decision. If one Government should complain that a navy officer of 
the other country had deviated from the stipulations of the Treaty, his 
government would be bound to institute an inquiry and to inflict upon the 
officer, if found guilty of willful transgression, a punishment proportionate 
to the transgression.31 
By the end of the 1860s, the slave trade diminished greatly, and Congress 
asked for the abolition of the Mixed Courts of Justice in order to cut 
unnecessary expenditures.32 These courts were terminated in 1870, and their 
jurisdiction was transferred to national courts competent to deal with 
maritime prizes. Any American vessel captured by a British cruiser was to 
be sent for adjudication to New York or Key West, whichever should be 
more accessible, or was to be handed over to a United States cruiser, if one 
should be available in the neighborhood of the capture; similarly, a British 
vessel captured by an American cruiser was to be sent for adjudication to 
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the nearest or most accessible British colony, or was to be handed over to 
a British cruiser, if one should be available in the neighborhood of capture. 
All enslaved Africans on board either an American or British vessel were 
to be handed over to the nearest British authority, to be immediately set free 
and guaranteed liberty by the British Government. If some of them had to 
be sent with the detained vessel as necessary witnesses, they were to be set 
free as soon as their testimony should no longer be required and their liberty 
was to be guaranteed.33 This ambitious treaty ended the American-British 
debate about visit and search, but it had little practical effect as the slave 
trade across the Atlantic came to an end at about the same time as a result 
of Brazil's change of attitude and its willingness to take effective action 
against importation of slaves.34 
The work of the abolitionists was not yet finished. In the meantime, there 
was an increase in slave traffic from East Africa across the Indian Ocean, 
which led in 1888 to the renewal of the debate about the right of visit and 
search between, on the one hand, Great Britain and Germany, who were 
supposedly helping the Sultan of Zanzibar to blockade the coast, and, on the 
other hand, France. In addition, problems arose between Great Britain and 
Germany, which dealt harshly with captured vessels, their crews, and even 
the liberated cargo.35 
When the Brussels conference on the affairs of Africa was convened by 
King Leopold II of Belgium in 1889, the British Government made sure that 
the issue of terminating maritime slave traffic would be on the agenda, and 
proposed a general agreement to establish a specific slave trade zone within 
which the signatory powers would have the "right of supervision, jointly and 
severally, whether on high seas or in territorial waters, over all sailing vessels 
under any flag."36 The proposal was to be implemented by bringing the 
captured slavers before mixed tribunals representing at least five of the 
signatory powers; by turning the offenders over to their own national 
authorities for punishment under their own laws, which would provide for 
severe penalties; and by establishing international offices to exchange 
information not only about the slave trade but also about ships authorized 
to fly each national flag and the sentences passed on slavers.37 
The French Government responded with a proposal which allowed 
inspection within a more limited zone of only indigenous vessels for the sole 
purpose of verifying the flag. It required, in case of doubt about a vessel's 
right to fly a particular flag, that the investigation be handed over to the 
flag nation. It provided for returning the vessel to the captor if it was not 
entitled to fly the flag it claimed, and imposed compensation for wrongful 
arrest, to be settled, in case of a dispute, by an international tribuna1.38 
The Russian jurist, Frederic de Martens, was given the task of preparing 
a compromise solution, and his proposal became chapter III of the General 
Act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, signed at Brussels on July 
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2, 1890.39 It provided for more effective repression of the slave trade in the 
maritime zone of the Indian Ocean extending from south of Madagascar to 
Persia {Iran} in the north, and including the Red Sea and the Persian {Arab} 
Gulf. The surveillance was to be limited to native vessels whose tonnage was 
less than 500 tons. A warship of any signatory power, having reason to believe 
that a vessel of such tonnage, navigating within the specified zone, was 
engaged in the slave trade or was guilty of the fraudulent use of a flag, was 
entitled only to examine the ship's papers; any further search or calling the 
roll of the crew and passengers was only authorized when permitted by a 
prior convention for suppression of the slave trade concluded by the flag state 
of the vessel. Should the acts of supervision permitted by the treaty or 
convention convince the naval officer in command of the cruiser that 
irrefutable proofs existed of fraudulent use of the flag or participation in the 
slave trade, he had to bring the arrested vessel to the nearest port of the zone 
where there was a competent magistrate of the flag state of that vessel or 
to turn it over to a cruiser of that vessel's nationality, if the latter consented 
to take charge of it. If the investigation by the magistrate proved that the 
flag was fraudulently used, the vessel would be put at the disposal of the 
captor. If slaves should be found on board or any other offense connected 
with the slave trade was proven, the vessel and cargo would remain 
sequestered in charge of the magistrate who had conducted the investigation 
until the vessel had been properly condemned and transferred to the captor, 
or declared innocent and permitted to continue on its course. The slaves were 
to be liberated by the local authority and either returned home or settled 
on the spot. If the vessel was illegally arrested, an indemnity had to be fixed 
by the magistrate in proportion to the damage suffered by the vessel being 
taken out of its course. If the officer of the capturing vessel disagreed as to 
the amount of the indemnity the matter had to be immediately submitted 
to arbitration. The captain and the crew of the vessel condemned for an 
offense were to be brought promptly before a tribunal of the nation whose 
flag had been used by the accused or to a specially commissioned authority 
of that nation. 
The main antagonists were satisfied with the final text. The British 
Government received the right to visit all likely slave-carrying vessels within 
the zone, and French vessels were freed from visit and search outside the 
zone.40 Nevertheless, the French Chamber of Deputies refused to accept the 
provisions relating to the verification of the flag, and to preserve the treaty 
France was allowed to exclude these clauses in its ratification document.41 
In consequence, the apparent consensus disintegrated and a shadow was 
thrown again on the right of visit and search. 
By the end of the 19th century, the measures taken under the Brussels Act 
contributed to the almost complete abolition of the slave trade, though it 
survived under various guises in a few places throughout the 20th century.42 
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In revising the map of the world after the First World War, the victors decided 
to get rid of the cumbersome anti-slavery provisions of the Brussels Act, and 
replaced them as between the parties to one of the Saint-Germain Conventions 
of 1919, by a provision which merely contained a general statement that the 
parties will endeavor "to secure the complete suppression of slavery in all 
its forms and of the black slave trade by land and sea. "43 
In 1925, the British Government proposed to the League of Nations the 
adoption of a convention implementing the general provision of the 1919 
convention. It suggested strong enforcement measures including a provision 
that "[ t ]he act of conveying slaves on the high seas shall be deemed to be 
an act of piracy, and the public ships of the signatory powers shall have the 
same rights in relation to vessels and persons engaged in such act as over vessels 
and persons engaged in piracy." It also would have provided for a decision 
by the courts and according to the laws of the country of the captor with 
respect to the validity of the capture of the vessel and the liberation of slaves, 
but for handing over of the persons engaged in the act of conveying slaves 
on the high seas to the authorities of their own country which was to bring 
them before its court. 
In view of a strong opposition to these proposals, the special committee 
to which this matter was referred limited the provision in Article 3, paragraph 
2, of the 1926 Convention on the Suppression of Slave Trade and Slavery to 
an undertaking to negotiate a convention based on an agreement concluded 
in 1925 relating to international trade in arms, which, in turn, contained 
enforcement provisions similar to those of the 1890 Brussels Act, including 
restrictions to native vessels of limited size, special zones, the right to verify 
the nationality of the suspected vessel, and the authorities entitled to decide 
about the illegality of the trade.44 Article 3, paragraph 3, of the 1926 
Convention also authorized the parties to it "to conclude between themselves, 
. without, however, derogating from the principles laid down in the preceding 
paragraph, such special agreements as, by reason of their peculiar situation, 
might appear suitable in order to bring about as soon as possible the complete 
disappearance of the slave trade." Neither these special agreements nor the 
supplementary convention envisaged in paragraph 2 of the Article have, 
however, been concluded, and the British effort was sidetracked again.45 
After a lapse of almost thirty years, the indomitable British diplomats tried 
again, taking advantage of a 1951 report of the United Nations Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery which complained that the then existing arrangements 
for suppressing slave trade at sea were less satisfactory then those of the 1890 
Brussels Act. They suggested the preparation of a convention which would 
supplement the 1926 Convention by declaring slave trading on the high seas 
to be a "crime similar to piracy in international law," and subjecting slave 
trading to the same treatment and punishment as piracy.46 The British 
Government presented such a draft convention in 1954. It contained provisions 
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similar to those presented by it in 1925. It proposed to make slave trade 
equivalent to piracy, but instead of the detailed provisions relating to capture 
and legal proceedings against the vessel and the crews, it merely proposed 
that the "[p ]ublic vessels under the control of parties to this Convention shall 
have the same rights in relation to vessels engaged in [the act of conveying 
slaves on the high seas or slave-raiding] as they have in relation to vessels 
and persons engaged in acts of piracy. "47 A Drafting Committee appointed 
by the Economic and Social Council revised the British draft several times, 
and prepared a more elaborate article making clear that the provisions relating 
to the slave trade would apply only to specified areas of the Indian Ocean, 
and added a provision authorizing warships or military aircraft to exercise 
the same rights of visit, search and seizure in relation to vessels "suspected 
on reasonable grounds of being engaged in the act of conveying slaves as they 
have in relation to vessels so suspected of being engaged in acts of piracy. " 
It limited the enforcement to vessels of parties to the proposed Convention, 
and a proposal to extend it to "stateless vessels" was withdrawn.48 At the 
Conference held in 1956 to adopt the convention, strong opposition was 
expressed to the provisions relating to visit, search, and seizure by foreign 
warships. A more limited draft restricted to visit and search, and leaving 
further action to the flag state, was also rejected.49 Consequently, the 1956 
Convention leaves the enforcement completely in the hands of the flag state. 
It requires only that states take effective measures to prevent the transport 
of slaves by ships and aircraft and to "punish persons guilty of such acts or 
of using a national flag for the purpose. " They must also exchange information 
to ensure practical coordination of measures for combating the slave trade. 
It is also provided that "[a ]ny slave who takes refuge on board any vessel 
of the State Party to this Convention shall ipso facto be free."so 
During the 1950s, in the context of the codification of the international 
law of the sea, the International Law Commission also encountered the 
question of the scope of the rule relating to the right to visit and search foreign 
vessels on the high seas. Its rapporteur, Professor J. P. A. Francois, in his first 
report stated that the" only police measure [on the high seas] allowed in time 
of peace is the right of approach, that is to say the right to ascertain the identity 
and nationality of the vessel, but not the right to check nationality by 
examination of ship's papers, and not, a fortiori, the right of search." After 
noting the British efforts to establish "the legality, if not of boarding foreign 
merchant vessels, at any rate of the verification of the flag," he pointed out 
that wireless telegraphy had almost eliminated the various reasons for which 
formerly vessels were induced to make material contact with each other on 
the high seas.51 
In his second report, Professor Francois stuck to his position with respect 
to the main principle, but added three clarifications. Acts of interference may 
be allowed by a treaty; boarding and further action may be justified, if "there 
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is a reasonable ground for suspecting that the vessel is engaged in piracy;" 
and, if suspicion of piracy should "prove to be unfounded and should the 
stopped vessel not have given by unjustified acts any ground for suspicion, 
the vessel shall be compensated for any loss due to stoppage. "52 
In view of concurrent discussions in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee 
on Slavery,53 Professor Francois suggested that some special provisions on 
slave trade might be included in the International Law Commission's draft. 
He rejected, however, the proposal that slave trade be regarded as an act 
of piracy, permitting the stoppage and search of any vessel suspected of 
engaging in such a trade by any warship and taking it to a port of the captor 
for trial there by national courts. He pointed out the following differences 
between piracy and slave trade: 
Part at least of the ground for internationalizing the crime of piracy is that the acts 
occur on the high seas and that in many cases there are no relations between the pirate 
and a given country. The slave trade, on the other hand, takes place between two given 
countries. Since both these countries are bound to cooperate in repressing the slave trade, 
internationalization- meaning that the vessel may be conducted to any port for trial 
by the local courts-does not appear appropriate. 
He considered also that the right of control in this case should be limited 
to small vessels below a specified tonnage, and should not extend to the whole 
area of the high seas but to a limited area only where slave trade is still carried 
on, by analogy to the Berlin Act of 1890.54 Finally, he made clear that a visit 
of a suspected vessel should be restricted to an examination of its papers, that 
examination of the cargo or search of the vessel is permissible only when, 
and to the extent, authorized by a convention to which the vessel's flag state 
is a party, that trial should be by the courts of the flag state of the captured 
vessel, and that in case of illegal arresl an indemnity would have to be paid.55 
During the discussion of his report by the International Law Commission, 
Professor Francois pointed out that while old types of slavery were 
disappearing, the concept of slavery was being widened, thus threatening that 
vessels would be boarded "at all times and in all places," and increasing the 
hesitancy of states to accept the right of approach. When die prohibition of 
slavery and slave trade by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights56 was 
invoked in order to justify the exercise of the right of approach "everywhere 
in respect of vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade," Francois 
replied that "[ t]o recognize that the slave trade was prohibited was one thing, 
to recognize the right of approach was another."57 
The Commission decided in 1951 that in the interests of stamping out the 
slave trade, the right of approach to ships ~ngaged in the slave trade "should 
be put on the same footing as in the case of piracy, and hence should be 
permissible without regard to zone or tonnage."58 Consequently, Professor 
Francois submitted the following proposal to the Commission concerning the 
right of approach, designed to safeguard the freedom of navigation and to 
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prohibit, except in clearly defined cases, the boarding and inspection of ships 
on the high seas: 
Except where acts of interference are done under powers conferred by treaty, a 
warship which encounters a foreign merchant vessel at sea is not justified in boarding 
her or in taking any further action unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that 
the vessel is engaged in piracy or in the slave trade. Should such suspicions prove to 
be unfounded and should the stopped vessel not have given by unjustified acts any ground 
for suspicion, the vessel shall be compensated for any loss due to the stoppage.59 
In addition, he proposed the following separate article emphasizing the duty 
to cooperate in measures for the repression of the slave trade: 
All States are required to cooperate for the more effective repression of the slave 
trade. They undertake to adopt efficient measures to prevent the transport of slaves 
on vessels authorized to fly their colours and to prevent the unlawful use of their flag 
for the purpose. 
Any slave who has taken refuge on board a ship of war or a merchant vessel shall 
be ipso facto set free.60 
Similar provisions on slave trade were included in the rapporteur's 1954 report 
and in the Commission's 1955 text. The 1954-55 texts contained also, for the 
first time, more elaborate provisions on piracy.61 New difficulties did arise, 
however, with respect to the right-of-approach proposal. At the 1955 session 
of the Commission, Professor Scelle revived the traditional distinction 
between the right to verify the flag and the right to board and search, and 
pointed out that the existing situation was dangerous as the "exercise of the 
right of verification could easily, and almost imperceptibly, become an act 
of boarding and searching;" that it "was the thin edge of the wedge;" and 
that "such possibility should be guarded against." As a remedy he suggested 
that "verification should take place on board the investigating warship."62 
In reply, Professor Francois explained that "the problem of the policing of 
the high seas was both complex and difficult." He pointed out that: 
It was generally accepted that warships had the right to demand that merchant vessels 
at sea should show their flag upon request. Such a request for identification was perfectly 
natural, because it was not the usual practice for merchant vessels continually to fly 
their flags at sea. It was also widely recognized that, if the merchant vessel refused 
to show her flag or gave an evasive reply, the warships had the right to investigate 
her identity. That, again, was an essential condition for the control of piracy .... 
Sanctions for unjustified verification had previously been provided in the form of 
damages, the award of which was to be made by one of two methods. The first, and 
more severe, was that whereby, if the suspicion proved to be unfounded, compensation 
must be rendered for any loss due to the stoppage. The second, and less stringent, 
provided for compensation to be paid ifit could be shown that the vessel had been stopped 
for insufficient reason. He had chosen the first of those alternatives because of the 
liability to abuse in the application of the second owing to the difficulty of judging 
motives. 
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He opposed, however, the proposal that verification should take place on 
board the investigating warship, stressing "the danger in even a moderate 
sea of carrying the ship papers-the loss of which would be a most serious 
matter-to and from the investigating warship in a small open boat." With 
some exceptions, the practice of investigation on board the merchant vessel 
has been followed since 1659.63 
Professor Scelle insisted, however, that the need to verify the flag goes 
far beyond piracy and slave trade, is essential for the general policing of the 
seas in view of the fraudulent practices in the registration of ships and the 
need to determine responsibility for any damage done by merchant vessels 
on the high seas by violating general rules on navigation or pollution. He 
added later that "it was as important to prevent ships from sailing under false 
colours as it was to suppress slavery and piracy." 
This view was opposed by several members of the Commission who wanted 
the right to verify a vessel's flag restricted to piracy and slave trade. The 
Scelle proposal for a general right of flag verification was rejected by a vote 
of 6 to 2, with 2 abstentions.64 The rapporteur accepted more easily the 
suggestion that a warship should be allowed to board a foreign-flag vessel 
if there was a reasonable ground to suspect that the vessel was in fact of the 
same nationality as the warship. It was generally recognized also that a 
warship can verify the flag of merchant vessels flying the same flag as the 
warship, and can seize it and bring to a port of the flag state for punishment 
if the vessel was flying the flag without authority.6S 
Another controversy arose with respect to the right to visit and search a 
vessel when a warship has reason to suspect it of engaging, "during times 
of imminent peril to the security of the State, in activities hostile to the State 
of the warship."66 This proposal was supported on the basis of the general 
principle of self-defense, but it was objected that this principle cannot be 
applied to boarding a vessel on the high seas on mere suspicion that it was 
threatening the security of a state, as such "exception to the principle of the 
freedom of navigation might destroy that freedom altogether, since States 
would tend to invoke the argument of legitimate defense to justify any act 
of interference. "67 As a result of that discussion, the Commission's comment 
to the article on the right of visit explained that the Commission found it 
inadvisable to provide for the right to board a vessel being suspected of 
committing acts hostile to the state to which the warship belongs, at a time 
of imminent danger to the security of that state, as there was a danger of 
abuse because of the vagueness of terms like "imminent danger" and "hostile 
acts. "68 
The draft of text and comments approved by the Commission in 1955 was 
only slightly changed in 1956, when the Commission adopted the final report 
for the Law of the Sea Conference. In this report the Commission extended 
the right to visit also to the situation where there is reasonable ground for 
Sohn 55 
suspecting that "while flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the 
vessel is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship." The Commission 
explained that in this case "it can be presumed that the vessel has committed 
unlawful acts and the warship should be at liberty to verify whether its 
suspicions are justified." At the same time, the Commission limited the 
boarding of ships suspected of slavery to maritime zones treated as suspect 
in the international conventions for the abolition of slave trade, in order to 
ensure that the right of control would not be used as a pretext for exercising 
the right of visit in waters where the slave trade would not normally be 
expected to exist.69 
At the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, the provisions on slave trade were 
strongly attacked by delegations of several African and Eastern European 
states. For instance, Mr. Ben Salem (Tunisia) argued that: 
No state had the right to police the high seas. No state had the right to interfere with 
the ships of another State on the high seas. The provisions relating to the slave trade 
and piracy were of purely historical interest. The provision regarding action based on 
a suspicion that a ship was engaged in the slave trade should not be used as a pretext 
for inspecting a ship when there was no warrant for such suspicion. Warships, although 
they had the right to determine what flag a foreign ship was flying, did not have the 
right to determine whether it had the right to fly the flag, or a fortiori, the right to visit 
the ship. Unfortunately, the fears he was voicing on the subject were justified by a 
number of acts of interference which had been committed recently ... [C]ertain states 
had arrogated to themselves the right to inspect and detain ships of other states on the 
high seas as if they owned the high seas. Such an act was an infringement of the law 
and a violation of the principle of the freedom of the seas.70 
Mr. El Erian (United Arab Republic, later Egypt) considered that there 
was no justification for a provision allowing warships to board ships suspected 
of engaging in slave trade in certain maritime zones specified in the 1890 Act 
of Brussels. While such provision had perhaps been justified in the nineteenth 
century, conditions had changed since, as was recognized in the 1919, 1926, 
and 1956 conventions on abolition of slavery which contained no such 
provisions. Such a provision "was objectionable and a potential source of 
disputes. ''71 Egypt proposed, therefore, the deletion of the provision presented 
by the International Law Commission.72 Mr. Keilin (Soviet Union) supported 
such deletion for several reasons: 
In the first place, would it not be discriminatory automatically to regard certain maritime 
zones as suspect in the matter of the slave trade? It was well known which countries 
had warships cruising in those neighbourhoods and had interests which would be served 
by the right of visit thus established. Secondly, it was inadmissible and unjustified to 
presume that ships in the "suspect" zones were engaged in the slave trade; such a 
suspicion would probably only be a pretext for controlling maritime trade in violation 
of the principle of the freedom of the high seas. Thirdly, the sub-paragraph was in no 
way necessary for effectively combating the slave trade, and it seemed that the 
International Law Commission had allowed itself to be influenced by happenings in a 
former age in an entirely different set of circumstances, of which the memory lay 
sleeping in the dust of archives. Finally, the provision ran counter to the Supplementary 
Convention on Slavery of 1956, article 3 of which laid down that the transport or 
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attempted transport of slaves from one country to another was a penal offence and that 
persons found guilty of such offences were liable to severe penalties. The suppression 
of such offences could and should be undertaken by the States of which the flag was 
flown by the ships attempting to engage in the transport of slaves.73 
The Egyptian amendment was defeated in the Second Committee of the 
Law of the Sea Conference by 22 votes to 16, with 11 abstentions.74 One of 
the abstainers was Ghana, which objected primarily to the restriction of the 
right to board ships suspected of slave trade to a specific region. Its delegation 
preferred a provision that would allow the boarding of "ships suspected of 
slaving wherever they might be. "75 The idea was revived at the time of the 
final vote in the plenary meeting of the Conference, where South Africa 
proposed the deletion of the reference to the maritime zones suspected of 
slave trade, as a counterproposal to the proposal by the United Arab Republic 
and Saudi Arabia to completely delete the provision granting the right to 
board ships suspected of slave trade. The South African proposal was approved 
by 32 votes to 25, with 15 abstentions, and the other proposal was withdrawn. 
The right to board article was then approved by 62 votes to none with 9 
abstentions.76 
As a result of these developments the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,77 
which-according to its preamble-is "generally declaratory of established 
principles of intemationallaw," contains eight elaborate articles on piracy, 
a general article concerning national measures to prevent and punish the 
transport of slaves, and an article allowing boarding of foreign merchant 
vessels on the high seas in three specified cases. 
One of the piracy articles is the only article which provides expressly for 
the seizure of the pirate vessel or aircraft, the arrest of the persons and a 
decision of all issues by the court of the state of the warship that captured 
the private ship or aircraft. Article 19 provides, in particular, as follows: 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of 
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State 
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, 
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. 
Article 13 imposes on each state the following general obligation with 
respect to the maritime slave trade: 
Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves 
in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that 
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship whatever its flag, shall, ipso facto, 
be free. 
Finally, Article 22 authorizes the following minimal rights of interference 
with foreign ships on the high seas: 
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1. Except where acts ofinterference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship 
which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding 
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting: 
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or 
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or 
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, 
of the same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the warship may 
proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under 
the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents 
have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which 
must be carried out with all possible consideration. 
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not 
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that 
may have been sustained. 
The corresponding articles of the: 1982 Law of the Sea Convention78 contain 
only minor changes. Article 99, now entitled "Prohibition of the transport 
of slaves," and Article 105, now entitled "Seizure of private ship or aircraft," 
repeat word for word Articles 13 and 19 of the High Seas Convention. Only 
a few changes were made in Article 110 on the "Right to visit," which 
corresponds to Article 22 on the High Seas Convention. In the text of Article 
110, which follows, the changes and additions have been highlighted: 
1. Except where acts ofinterference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship 
which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity 
in accordance with Articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction 
under Article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, 
of the same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's 
right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer 
to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it 
may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out 
with all possible consideration. 
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not 
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that 
may have been sustained. 
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. 
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5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service. 
It may be noted that the 1958 text deals only with the interference by a 
warship with a "foreign merchant ship" on the high seas. It does not apply 
to an encounter between two warships, or between a warship and a 
government ship operated only for non-commercial purposes.79 This last point 
was made more explicit in the new text, which makes it clear that a foreign 
ship can be boarded in the specified limited circumstances only if it is "other 
than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 
96," namely, if it is a warship (Article 95) or a ship "owned or operated by 
a State and used only on government non-commercial service." 
While the "warship" that is permitted to interfere is narrowly defined in 
the 1958 Convention as a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State, properly 
marked as such, commanded by a duly commissioned naval officer and manned 
by a crew under regular naval discipline,so the 1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea permits action under Article 110 to be taken also by a military 
aircraft, as well as "duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service. "SI Thus, even though it might 
have been doubtful whether the Coast Guard was entitled to act under the 
1958 Convention, it has a clear right to take action under the 1982 Convention 
provisions to the extent that they are generally accepted as rules of customary 
internationallaw.82 
The 1958 and 1982 Conventions have broadened in two ways the field of 
applicability of the 1890 General Act of Berlin: their provisions are applicable 
to all vessels, not as previously only to vessels of less than 500 tons; and they 
are applicable to all the oceans, not only to a small part of the Indian Ocean 
and its subsidiary seas and gulfs.83 
Finally it should be noted that originally there were only two grounds for 
stopping a foreign ship, namely the existence of reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy or slave trade. Later, the case 
was added of a ship suspected of concealing the fact that it was of the same 
nationality as the warship. The 1982 Convention went two steps further, 
adding ships suspected of being "without nationality," and-under strong 
pressure by Western European countries-ships suspected of engaging in 
unauthorized broadcasting.84 In the latter case, only warships of three 
categories of countries and two specific groups of countries were allowed 
to board such ships, namely, those of the flag State of the ship; the State of 
registration of a high seas installation; the State of which the person engaged 
'" in broadcasting is a national; any State where the transmissions can be 
received; or any State where authorized radio communication is suffering 
interference.85 While illegal broadcasting belongs clearly to a special 
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category, it was included because of the existence of the European regional 
convention on the subject.86 
The question of control over stateless vessels arose several times in previous 
discussions, especially after the controversial British law of 1839,87 and more 
recently at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, where the subject 
became complicated by the fear that a warship might be able to stop any 
vessel on the high seas by claiming that the vessel is stateless because there 
was no genuine link between the vessel and the flag state.88 The inclusion 
of the right to board stateless vessels in the 1982 Convention was due to the 
general acceptance of the proposition that it was dangerous to have ships 
sailing on the high seas which were not subject to the jurisdiction of any State, 
and being law unto themselves did not comply with any generally accepted 
international regulations to ensure safety at sea. Consequently, the rule was 
adopted that such a ship can be stopped by any warship and dealt with 
according to the law of the warship's State.89 It is not clear what would happen 
if the examination should show that the stopped ship has complied with all 
international regulations and there was no valid reason for interfering with 
its navigation. In any case, the persons on board the ship should be treated 
in accordance with the internationally recognized human rights, and if they 
have not been found engaged in any illegal activity, their basic "right to life, 
liberty and the security of person" should be recognized.90 Unless these 
persons are also stateless, they may be entitled to the protection of the State 
of their nationality regardless of the fact that they are travelling on a stateless 
vessel.91 Even if they are stateless, they are entitled to basic human rights.92 
An additional complication is caused by the provisions in the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas and of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 
which establish the rule that a "ship which sails under the flags of two or 
more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the 
nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality. "93 Some states have considered this 
provision as a license to treat such a ship and its crew in any way they please, 
forgetting their obligations under international law of human rights. In 
particular, the rules about equal treatment and non-discrimination are 
applicable to the persons on these ships, and regardless of the place in which 
the alleged crime was committed they are entitled to be protected against 
governmental violations of internationally recognized human rights.94 
III. Campaign Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
There is another important difference between the 1958 and 1982 
Conventions. While the 1958 Convention on the High Seas contained no 
provision on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, the 1958 Convention on the 
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Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone had a limited provision on the subject 
in Article 19, which read as follows: 
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coast~l State should not be exercised on board a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its 
passage, save only in the following cases: 
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; or 
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order 
of the territorial sea; or 
(c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the 
ship or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or 
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State'to take any steps 
authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign 
ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters. 
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the coastal State shall, 
if the captain so requests, advise the consular authority of the flag State before taking 
any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such authority and the ship's crew. In 
cases of emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being 
taken. 
4. In considering whether or how an arrest should be made, the local authorities shall 
pay due regard to the interests of navigation. 
5. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a foreign ship passing through 
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection 
with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, 
proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without 
entering internal waters.95 
This convention thus authorized the coastal states to arrest any person or 
to conduct any investigation on board a foreign ship passing through their 
territorial sea, ifit is necessary for "the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs," subject to conditions specified in paragraphs 3 and 5, and paying" due 
regard to the interests of navigation" (paragraph 4). 
This provision can be traced to a more limited suggestion of the 
International Law Commission, that was due to an initiative of the 
Government of Israel which called to the attention of the Commission the 
fact that its draft on the regime of the territorial sea contained no mention 
of the right of the coastal state to take steps to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs.96 In 1956, at the last session of the Commission devoted to the law 
of the sea, Professor Francois, the Rapporteur of the Commission on the 
regime of the territorial sea, was asked whether a reference on this subject 
should be added in the text of the article relating to the arrest on board a 
foreign vessel in the territorial sea. He replied that the paragraph allowing 
coastal state action if the consequences of a criminal act extended beyond 
the vessel would almost always apply to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.97 
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The final report of the Commission added a sentence in the commentary to 
Article 20, stating that an "arrest for the purposes of suppressing illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs may be justifiable, if the condition in sub-paragraph (a) is 
fulfilled," i.e., if "the consequences of the crime extend beyond the ship. "98 
At the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea the issue was revived by 
Pakistan, which proposed the addition of a sub-paragraph in Article 20, which 
would allow the coastal state, in certain specified circumstances, to arrest 
a person on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea, "[i]f it 
is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. "99 
The First Committee of the Conference adopted this proposal by 33 votes 
to 8, with 30 abstentions, after a short discussion. lOO On the one hand, it was 
argued by the representative of Turkey that this proposal dealt with an issue 
of such importance that the proposal should be broadened; it should not be 
limited to the territorial sea as "the question of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
was of universal concern. "101 On the other hand, some delegates thought that 
this addition was not necessary, as it was covered by other subparagraphs 
of Article 20, relating to the right of arrest if "the consequence of the crime 
extend beyond the ship," or "the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of 
the country or the good order of the territorial sea. "102 The representative 
of Norway doubted whether such provision would assist in suppressing illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs, as "it was difficult to imagine cases where crimes 
of the kind envisaged in the Pakistan proposal would actually have been 
committed on the ship during its passage." He also noted that the proposed 
text would enable the coastal state to detain and search ships on mere 
suspicion, causing delays and derogating considerably from the right of 
innocent passage. He suggested that a "coastal State which had good reason 
to suspect that a ship passing through the territorial sea was being used for 
purposes of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs would be better advised to alert 
the ship's first port of call, where appropriate action could be taken.103 
Article 20 of the Territorial Sea Convention with only minor drafting 
changes became Article 27 of the 1982 Law of the Sea C.onvention. In 
particular, the provision relating to narcotic drugs was changed slightly, 
allowing arrest of any person on board or an investigation, if "such measures 
are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances. "104 
Although the 1958 Convention on the High Seas contained no provision 
on narcotic drugs, a basic provision on the subject was included in Article 
108 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. No complementary 
provision was included, however, in Article 110 relating to the right of visit. 
This is especially surprising in view of the fact that the other new 1982 version, 
the one relating to unauthorized broadcasting-discussed above-is followed 
up by listing that activity as one of those justifying boarding a suspected vessel. 
In addition, Article 109, paragraph 4, makes clear that anyone of the states 
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specified in that article "may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person 
or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting 
apparatus." There are no parallel provisions with respect to illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs. 
It has to be noted, however, that during the drafting of Articles 108 and 
109 suggestions were made for strengthening these provisions for the control 
of illegal traffic in narcotic drugs. The United Kingdom delegation, true to 
its tradition of support for the policing of the high seas, suggested in 1974 
that the convention on the law of the sea should contain provisions with regard 
to ships found trafficking in narcotics. lOS A draft was soon presented which, 
in addition to language that, with minor changes, became the text of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 108 of the Convention, contained the following 
proposal: 
Any state which has reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel is engaged in illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs may, whatever the nationality of the vessel but provided that 
its tonnage is less than 500 tons, seize the illicit cargo. The State which carried out 
this seizure shall inform the State of nationality of the vessel in order that the latter 
State may institute proceedings against those responsible for the illicit traffic. 
This proposal was included in this form in the Second Committee's basic 
compilation of proposals expressing the "main trends" at the Conference on 
a particular topic, together with a suggestion that a reference to psychotropic 
substances should be added in appropriate places.106 Nevertheless, when the 
Chairman of the Second Committee prepared in 1975 the first "informal single 
negotiating text," he included the two other paragraphs in Article 94 of his 
text, but omitted the clause allowing the seizure of illegal cargo by any state, 
and providing for the punishment by the flag state of the persons responsible 
for the illegal traffic.lo7 The delegation of Peru revived the issue in 1980, when 
it recommended both adding in Article 108 a provision on cooperation with 
the coastal state in case of seizure of a foreign vessel in that state's exclusive 
economic zone by a warship of a third state, and an addition in Article 110 
of a provision allowing boarding on the high seas of vessels engaged in the 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.108 Neither of these 
proposals was incorporated in the final text. 
Consequently, there is no mention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in 
Article 110, and Article 108 provides only that: 
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to international 
conventions. 
2. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its flag is 
engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request the 
co-operation of other States to suppress such traffic. 
Three issues raised by this provision need to be emphasized. In the first 
place, the obligation to "co-operate" is generally considered as a "weak" 
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obligation, merely a promissory note, which requires implementation by more 
detailed provisions, such as those relating to piracy (1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Articles 101-107) or unauthorized broadcasting (Article 109, 
paragraphs 2-4 and 110, paragraph l{c)). 
Second, paragraph 2 is carefully restricted. Only the flag state is entitled 
to ask other states for co-operation in catching one of its ships, if it has 
reasonable grounds for believing that this ship is engaged in illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs. The opposite side is not mentioned-whether another state 
is entitled to ask the flag state to allow the boarding of a suspected vessel 
sailing under that flag. This is a clear case of "don't call me, I'll call you," 
designed to protect the flag state against finding itself in the unpleasant 
situation where it would have to permit boarding, as otherwise it would be 
suspected of assisting the drug trafficker. Its right to protect its vessels against 
possibly unwarranted interference is thereby destroyed for all practical 
purposes. Consequently, instead of a practice of ad hoc arrangements, flag 
states are likely to prefer the conclusion in advance of a basic agreement that 
would spell out the permitted measures and would provide some guarantee 
against possible abuses.109 
Third, paragraph 1 allows only the suppression of high seas traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which is "contrary to 
international conventions. " The obligation to co-operate thus depends on the 
content of several conventions relating to such drugs and substances which 
have been adopted since 1912.110 These conventions developed a system of 
co-operative arrangements for the suppression on illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances through control of manufacture, and of 
export and import, of such drugs and substances, exchange of information 
on illicit activities, and acceptance of an obligation to punish or extradite 
the offenders. 
All the previous conventions on the subject were replaced in 1961 by the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,1l1 which in t1;1rn was amended by a 
1972 Protocol.112 This convention improved the system of international control 
through strict limitation of manufacture, exports and imports of an increasing 
list of drugs. The States Parties to the convention agreed to co-operate closely 
in a co-ordinated campaign against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
to assist each other in the campaign;113 they agreed also to punish adequately 
the persons involved in such traffic, including those found guilty of intentional 
participation in, conspiracy to commit and attempts to commit, the offenses 
(listed in the convention) that were connected with such traffic.114 It should 
be noted, however, that no mention was made of any special co-operation 
with respect to any activities at sea, although it was known that a large 
proportion of illicit traffic was using ships for smuggling the drugs. The 1972 
Protocol strengthened the extradition provisions of the 1961 Convention, but 
again was silent on facilitating action against vessels engaged in illicit 
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traffic. ll5 Similarly, the parallel prOVlSlons of the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances did not mention enforcement at sea.116 
During the 1970s the United States mounted a comprehensive effort to stem 
the increasing flood of illicit drugs into the United States, and developed a 
program of interdiction on the high seas of vessels suspected of carrying 
narcotics to the United States. To justify the program under international 
law, the United States relied sometimes on the analogy to slavery, arguing 
that persons addicted to drugs are enslaved both to a dangerous habit and 
to the drug traffickers on whom they slavishly depend, willing to do anything 
to obtain the drugs needed to satisfy their constant craving for narcotics.ll7 
Although the United States was reluctant to utilize the treaty process 
envisaged by the introductory phrase in Article 22 of the Convention on the 
High Seas and by the parallel provision in Article 110 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, it started concluding informal arrangements with other 
countries, especially Latin American ones, which established an informal 
procedure for obtaining in each case a permission to board a particular vessel. 
A 1980 note by the United States to the United Kingdom describes these 
arrangements as follows: 
Upon initially intercepting a suspicious vessel the Coast Guard seeks, without boarding 
the vessel, to establish its identity and to develop other pertinent information. On the 
basis of this information, the government of the claimed or displayed nationality of 
registration is contacted to verify the claim or display of nationality. If this claim is 
not verified or is otherwise demonstrated to be false, the United States Coast Guard 
may then approach the suspected vessel and proceed against it, as if it were a United 
States flag vessel, in accordance with the principles relating to stateless vessels embodied 
in Articles 6 and 22 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas. If, however, the claim 
or display of nationality is verified, and absent other facts, a special arrangement must 
be entered into with the flag state if the Coast Guard is to be allowed to board, search, 
and, if contraband is found seize the foreign flag vessel. Only after an arrangement has 
been reached does the United States Coast Guard take action with respect to the 
suspected vessel, and then only in strict compliance with the arrangement. 
In some cases the government concerned grants the Government of the United States 
permission to board, search and, if contraband is found indicating a violation of United 
States law, seize the vessel under United States law and take all further actions 
concerning the vessel under United States law. Alternatively, some governments grant 
the Government of the United States permission to board and search and, if contraband 
is found, seize the suspected vessel and hold it for further action by the flag state. In 
the latter case, the suspected vessel is normally taken to a port in the United States 
where it is held for flag state authorities. The contraband is destroyed by the Government 
of the United States, with only evidentiary samples being retained. The crew is either 
expelled from the United States to their country or countries of nationality or prosecuted 
under United States law if there is sufficient evidence of intent to smuggle the narcotics 
into the United States. Due to United States constitutional restraints the Government 
of the United States cannot normally enter into undertakings with the flag state to hold 
the crew for flag state prosecution. Furthermore, in pursuing the alternative of holding 
the vessel for flag state action, it is made clear to the flag state that once the vessel 
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is in the United States the claims of third parties against the vessel may make it impossible 
for the Government of the United States to release the vessel to the flag state.lIS 
As the United Kingdom authorities were not willing to proceed in such 
an informal manner, an agreement was negotiated by the United States with 
that country, in the form of an exchange of notes,119 modelled to some extent 
on the liquor smuggling treaty of 1924.120 This agreement is a unilateral one; 
it allows the United States to board on the high seas (for which the agreement 
substituted the phrase "outside the limits of the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone of the United States") vessels under the British flag. It does not give 
the reciprocal right to the United Kingdom to board vessels under the United 
States flag, perhaps because the United States Congress may be still reluctant 
to allow United States citizens to be arrested on the high seas by foreign 
officials and tried by foreign courts. The boarding is permitted only in two 
geographically limited areas, comprising, in the first place, the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean West of 
longitude 55 West and South of latitude 30 North (i.e., a line drawn slightly 
East of the Antilles and then West to Florida), and, in the second place, an 
area extending 150 miles from the Atlantic coast, North of Florida. United 
States authorities are allowed to board in those areas private vessels under 
British flag "in any case in which those authorities reasonably believe that 
the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for importation into the United States 
in violation of the law of the United States." 
The agreement relies on the generally recognized reason for boarding, 
namely the right of a warship (or Coast Guard vessel) to establish the 
nationality of a vessel on the high seas. The boarding party may for this 
purpose "examine the ship's papers;" it may also, in this instance, "address 
enquiries to those on board," and "take such other measures as are necessary 
to establish the place of registration of vessel. " Then comes the shift: "When 
these measures suggest that an offense against the laws of the United States 
relative to the importation of drugs is being committed, the Government of 
the United Kingdom agrees that it will not object to the authorities of the 
United States instituting a search of the vessel. " While this provision is far-
reaching, it may be noted that it implies that the starting point for this 
reinforced suspicion cannot be a physical search of the ship (as this is the next 
step), but must be the result of findings derived from documents or statements 
by the captain or the crew. Finally, if the authorities of the United States 
have been led by the search to the belief that an offense against the anti-
drug laws of the United States is being committed, then they are allowed 
to seize the vessel and take it into a United States port. 
As all these steps are to a large extent in the discretion of the authorities 
of the United States and lend themselves easily to abuse, the United Kingdom 
Government reserved to itself the right to object, within 14 days of the vessel's 
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entry into port, to further exercise of United States' jurisdiction, and the 
United States agreed that thereupon it would release the vessel without 
charge. Similarly, if the United Kingdom, within 30 days of the vessel's entry 
into port, objects to the prosecution of any United Kingdom national found 
on board, such person has to be released by the United States. On the other 
hand, in a departure from the traditional rule that the flag state is entitled, 
and perhaps even obliged, to protect the members of the crew of its vessels 
regardless of their nationality,121 the United Kingdom agreed that it "will 
not otherwise object to the prosecution of any other person found on board 
the vessel." In order to enable the United Kingdom to make these requests, 
in every case of boarding of a vessel under the British flag the United States 
"shall promptly inform the authorities of the United Kingdom of the action 
taken and shall keep them fully informed of any subsequent development. " 
There is finally a weak provision for the settlement of disputes under this 
agreement, especially those relating to any loss or injury "suffered as a result 
of any action taken by the United States in contravention of these 
arrangements or any improper or unreasonable action taken by the United 
States pursuant thereto." In such a case, "representatives of the two 
Governments shall meet to decide any question relating to compensation." 
If they don't agree, there is no other recourse, as surprisingly there is no 
arbitration treaty between the two countries despite the fact that in the past 
they have found it possible to submit many claims to arbitration. 
There is not a perfect model, but a good beginning. Perhaps it is even too 
good, as the United States has not embarked, as it did in 1924, on a diplomatic 
effort to have similar agreements with all other interested States. It is possible 
that the mild restrictions of the United Kingdom agreement on possible abuse 
of power by the United States authorities are found too uncomfortable; and 
that these authorities prefer instead to obtain ad hoc consent for each search 
and seizure,l22 or even to pretend that the fact that the flag State did not 
later object is equivalent to an ex post facto ratification of the seizure.l23 It 
is in order to avoid such abuses of the basic rules of the international law 
of the sea and of the interrelated rules of international human rights law, 
that the Law of the Sea Conventions require "a treaty" properly defining 
the allowable searches and seizures and providing at least some minimum 
guarantees that the fate of the ship and of the captain and the crew will not 
be at the complete mercy of the foreign warship.124 
At the same time, other countries became concerned about the growth of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the need for adequate international 
arrangements to deal with this issue. When the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs established in 1982 an expert group to study the functioning, adequacy 
and enhancement of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Canada 
used this occasion to propose to that group the preparation of an "arrangement 
for law enforcement authorities to board vessels flying foreign flags. "125 The 
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group of experts noted that "bilateral arrangements had been made in certain 
specified geographic areas whereby ships flying the flag of the other country 
concerned could be boarded and inspected in order to apprehend drug 
traffickers or to seize illicit narcotic drugs," and recommended the 
preparation of a study of existing agreements, analyzing their structure and 
functioning, and assessing their usefulness and advisability.l26 
On the basis of the experts' report, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and the United 
States presented a resolution to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs suggesting 
the adoption of certain modest measures "to improve international 
cooperation in the maritime interdiction of illicit drug traffic. "127 This 
proposal was adopted by the Economic and Social Council, with slight 
drafting changes; it emphasized the need for "effective steps by all States 
to provide, in accordance with relevant domestic constitutional safeguards 
and legislations, for prompt, positive and unmistaken identification of private 
vessels registered under their flags," and recommended several steps to 
achieve this goal. 128. Neither the four states' proposal, nor the Council's 
resolution mentioned, however, the problem of boarding foreign vessels. 
Nevertheless, a report by the Secretary-General noted that the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations Secretariat's Division on Narcotic 
Drugs have started studying the possible ramifications of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention, especially of Article 27 (criminal jurisdiction on board 
a foreign ship in the territorial sea) and Article 108 (cooperation with respect 
to illicit traffic on the high seas), as well as of the effect of provisions 
broadening the jurisdiction of the coastal States by increasing the breadth 
of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone and the establishment of the 
exclusive economic zone and archipelagic waters. The view was expressed 
that some States seem to expect that "the complex problems States face in 
intercepting vessels suspected of smuggling drugs may be overcome with the 
entry into force of the Convention, in particular, that drug law enforcement 
agencies of States Parties would have a gre~ter ability to take action in respect 
of foreign ships in extended areas under their jurisdiction. "129 It was this 
approach that the United Kingdom and the United States were trying to avoid 
in their 1981 agreementl30 by substituting for the "high seas" a reference to 
the area "outside the limits of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone," 
thus indicating indirectly that a coastal State's jurisdiction with respect to 
the control of drug trafficking does not extend beyond the limits of the 
contiguous zone and does not, in particular, apply to the vast extent of the 
exclusive economic zone. 
Another approach was tried by two (partly overlapping) groups of Latin 
American countries, which proposed in 1984, respectively, that "traffic in 
narcotic drugs should be considered a crime against humanity, with all the 
legal consequences implicit therein," and that a "special conference should 
consider declaring drug trafficking to be a crime against humanity, since it 
68 Law of Naval Operations 
seriously affects people's lives, health and welfare, has a negative impact on 
the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of 
democratic processes in Latin America. "131 These proposals led to the adoption 
by the General Assembly of a resolution, supported by several additional 
countries of the Americas, Asia and Africa, including Canada and the United 
States, requesting the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate the 
preparation of a "draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs" 
which would deal, in particular, with problems "not envisaged in existing 
international instruments. "132 A draft convention, prepared by Venezuela, 
was annexed to the resolution; it would have condemned trafficking in 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances as "a grave international crime 
against humanity," and would have provided also for "imprescriptibility of 
the crimes" and "mutual assistance in combating illicit trafficking."133 A 
parallel Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse was 
adopted by the General Assembly at the same time; it also condemned drug 
trafficking, but called it only "an international criminal activity. "134 The 
delegate of the United Kingdom immediately objected to the application of 
the concept of the crime against humanity, which had "specific connotations 
in international law ," and "would give rise to prolonged and unproductive 
discussion. "135 On the other hand, the delegate of Argentina considered that 
drug trafficking was "a crime against humanity, and its declaration as such 
would make way for the formulation of precise legal definitions which would 
ensure that the crime was punished and that national borders were no longer 
used as shields for committing it. "136 
At the 1985 meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, several 
representatives made clear that their governments would find it impossible 
to accept a convention that included drug trafficking in the definition of 
crimes against humanity which had "specific historical and legal 
connotations," or included the proposal to make drug traffic crimes 
imprescriptible, as this proposal would "run counter to the principles of 
widely accepted penal policy." Many representatives supported the inclusion 
in the proposed new convention of provisions designed "to strengthen the 
capacity of Governments to render mutual law enforcement and judicial 
assistance;" in particular, it was emphasized that "the present opportunity 
should be taken to consider the problem of drug smuggling by ship," especially 
in view of "the difficulty encountered in intercepting suspect vessels on the 
high seas." It was also suggested that drug trafficking on the high seas "be 
given the same status as piracy, in international law. "137 
The Commission asked in 1985 for comments and suggestions concerning 
the elements to be included in the proposed convention. Australia replied that 
it might prove difficult to incorporate in the convention "the concept of 
interception on the high seas of vessels involved in drug trafficking." The 
United Kingdom emphasized the importance of maintaining "the principle 
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of free right of passage for ships on the high seas." Consequently, it 
proposed-together with the United States and Turkey-that any "provision 
allowing the stopping and boarding of vessels on the high seas . . . would 
have to make such intervention conditional upon the consent of the flag 
State." Egypt and Spain called attention to the 1982 Convention of the Law 
of the Sea and suggested that Article 108 of that convention could be 
elaborated upon in the new convention. Egypt and the United States revived 
the idea that "illicit traffic on the high seas might be assimilated to piracy 
and treated as such under applicable international law. " To implement that 
concept, the United States proposed that the convention should provide "that 
a State may request another State [for] authority to board a vessel flying the 
latter's flag and seize, arrest and prosecute as appropriate when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that such vessel is engaged in drug trafficking;" 
and that, upon receipt of such request, "the flag state would be required to 
take action to ensure that the vessel is not engaged, or permitted to engage 
further, in trafficking." Egypt, on the other hand, suggested that the new 
convention should take advantage of Articles 27 (criminal jurisdiction on 
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea) and 33 (contiguous 
zone) in order to cover also cases of illicit traffic in the territorial sea and 
the contiguous zone.138 
Some of these comments were echoed at the next meeting of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Strong opposition was expressed to the 
"qualification of illicit traffic as a crime against humanity," and to 
imprescriptibility of traffic offenses. On the other hand, several 
representatives supported the inclusion of provisions allowing for 
"appropriate intervention on the high seas in cases of illicit drug traffic," 
and of provisions encouraging "[i]mproved co-operation and bilateral and 
regional agreements in this field. "139 The Commission decided accordingly 
to include as one of the elements in its guidelines for the drafting of the 
convention the strengthening of "mutual co-operation among States in the 
suppression of illicit drug trafficking on the high seas. "140 
In June 1986, the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, with the assistance of a group of experts volunteered by several 
nations (including the United States), prepared a preliminary draft on the 
convention, Article 12 of which dealt with "illicit traffic by sea. "141 At its 
1987 session, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs had also before it another 
series of comments by the governments,142 including elaborate comments by 
the United States.143 The Commission was able to engage only in a general 
discussion and a preliminary consideration of non-controversial articles and 
of the difficult definitional article (Article 1); there was no discussion of 
Article 12.144 In the general debate, some representatives mentioned the need 
to strengthen Article 12, in order to make the high seas "off limits" to drug 
traffickers; others wanted to delete the provisions relating to search and 
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seizure of vessels, "because of the serious implications which their 
implementations could have in certain areas of international trade and also 
in view of their possible abuse by certain States. "145 
The Commission asked the Division of Narcotic Drugs to prepare a 
working document, consolidating all proposals, and recommended to the 
Economic and Social Council the establishment of an open-ended 
intergovernmental expert group to review that document, "to reach 
agreement on the articles of the convention, wherever possible, and to prepare 
a revised working document," to be reviewed by the Commission at the 
beginning of 1988.146 The Economic and Social Council approved this proposal 
in May 1987,147 and a group of 135 experts from 57 countries met promptly 
in Vienna in June and July 1987, reviewed the Secretariat document,148 and 
redrafted a number of articles of the draft convention, including Article 12.149 
One further development should be mentioned, which stimulated action 
in this field. The International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking, held at Vienna inJune 1987, approved as Target 28 for suggested 
courses of action on national, regional and international levels, to establish 
control over ships on the high seas and aircraft in international airspace. In 
particular, the Conference suggested the following courses of action: 
At the national level. Should the ministry or authority concerned have re~sonable grounds 
for suspecting that a vessel or aircraft registered under the laws of the State is illicitly 
carrying drugs, it may request another State to assist in carrying out a search: for 
example, that other State may be asked to direct its authorities to board and inspect 
the vessel and, if drugs are found, to seize them and arrest persons involved in the 
trafficking. In such circumstances, the State's own authorities may board or seize a vessel 
or aircraft registered under its laws. Subject to the provisions of international law , the 
law enforcement authorities should, to the fullest extent permitted by national law, 
undertake to board and seize a vessel unlawfully carrying drugs, provided that the 
authorization of the State of registry and, when applicable, of a coastal State has been 
obtained. A State should endeavour to respond promptly when asked for permission 
to stop, board and search a vessel under its registry for reasons of illicit drug trafficking 
control. Subject to the same considerations, an aircraft may be subject to search upon 
landing at a designated airport. 
The appropriate ministry or authority should, after the seizure of such a vessel or aircraft, 
deal promptly with illicit drugs and traffickers found thereon under the country's own 
laws if the conveyance is registered under that country's laws or, if registered under 
the laws of another State, pursuant to such agreement as is reached with the State of 
registry without unnecessary delay. 
States could authorize the appropriate agency or responsible authority to take 
appropriate action in these matters. This action might include the prompt 
communication of information indicating whether a particular vessel or aircraft is 
registered under the laws of the requested State and also authority to empower a 
requesting State to seize the suspect vessel or aircraft. 
At the regional and international levels. International bodies and States could consider whether 
international standards can be established for the identification, seizure and disposition 
of vessels and aircraft on the surface suspected of carrying drugs illicitly, and of the 
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drugs and traffickers found thereon. States should also make every effort to conclude 
bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements to strengthen such co-operation between 
States.lSQ 
At the same time, the Conference made clear that "appropriate co-operative 
procedures need to be devised which do not interfere with legitimate passage 
of commerce," and which comply with "existing relevant conventions."151 
In settling these issues, as shown over almost two hundred years of efforts, 
it did not prove easy to establish the balance between two aspects of national 
sovereignty-the freedom of a state's ship to navigate the oceans without 
interference by other states, and the right of other states to protect some 
important interests against a possibility of interference by foreign vessels 
engaged in a generally condemned activity. In the field of slavery, despite 
repeated efforts by some governments, international conferences consistently 
rejected any interference with foreign vessels which would go beyond the 
right to approach and to ascertain a vessel's flag and registration, and all 
attempts to equate slavery with piracy were unsuccessful. Once a vesse1's 
nationality has been ascertained, any further action had to be deferred to the 
flag state. 
Are coastal states entitled to go further as far as illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs is concerned? At the Third Law of the Sea Conference, only a few 
years ago, the decision went in the opposite direction, and the proposals to 
put drug trafficking on the same level as slavery were clearly rejected. In 
other negotiations, attempts to include illicit drug traffic among "crimes 
against humanity" were strongly opposed. There is clearly a hierarchy here-
piracy, slavery, drug traffic; and the measures that may be taken against a 
vessel engaging in such activities diminish gradually. 
In the recent negotiations on the new convention against illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the old arguments were often 
repeated, though sometimes in new, more modern guises. 
In particular as was noted previously, several proposals were made to 
declare that the traffic in illicit drugs was a "crime against humanity" or 
that it should be assimilated to "piracy. "152 In view of the strong opposition 
to these proposals by other Governments,153 the Secretariat of the United 
Nations did not include this concept in its early drafts,154 and no further 
mention was made of this issue. The United Kingdom was not able to achieve 
this objective with respect to slavery; now, it was the United States that was 
trying to achieve a similar goal with respect to the illicit drug traffic, but 
the opposition of the United Kingdom and other States made it impossible. 
Article 12 of the Secretariat's 1986 Draft155 became the focus of the debate 
on the "illicit traffic by sea." To facilitate the comparison, the semifinal text, 
referred by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1988 to the Plenipotentiary 
Conference, is also included here, the changes in the two texts being italicized, 
together with additions or omissions. 
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1986 Text: 
1. The Parties shall co-operate to 
the fullest extent possible to suppress 
the illicit traffic in controlled substances 
by sea. 
2. A Party which has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel 
registered under its laws is being used for 
the illicit traffic in controlled substances 
may request the assistance of other 
Parties in suppressing its use for that 
purpose. Parties so requested shall 
render such assistance, within the 
means available to them. 
3. A Party which has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a vessel is 
engaged in illicit traffic and is on the 
high seas as defined in Part VII of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea may board, search and seize 
such a vessel if: 
( a) The vessel is registered under its 
law; or 
(b) That Party seeks and receives 
permission from the Party of registry; or 
( c ) The vessel is not displaying a flag 
or markings of registry. 
4. A Party shall respond in an 
expeditious manner to requests from 
another Party to determine, for the 
purpose of paragraph 3 of this article, 
whether a vessel is registered under 
its laws, and to requests for permis-
sion made pursuant to the provisions 
in that paragraph. Each Party shall 
designate an authority to receive and 
act upon such requests. The authority 
designated by each Party for this 
purpose shall be notified through the 
Secretary General to all other 
Parties. 
1988 Text: 
1. The Parties shall co-operate to 
the fullest extent possible to suppress 
the illicit traffic by sea. 
2. If a Party, which has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel flying 
its flag or not displaying a flag or markings 
of registry is being used for the illicit 
traffic, requests the assistance of other 
Parties in suppressing its use for that 
purpose, the Parties so requested shall 
render such assistance, within the 
means available to them. 
3. Without prejudice to any rights 
provided for under general international 
law, a Party, which has reasonable 
grounds for believing that a vessel that 
is beyond the external limits of the 
territorial sea of any State and is flying the 
flag of another Party is engaged in illicit 
traffic, may, if that Party has received 
prior permission from the flag State, 
board, search and, if evidence of illicit 
traffic is discovered, seize such a vessel. 
4. For the purposes of paragraph 3 of this 
article, a Party shall respond in an 
expeditious manner to requests from 
another Party to determine whether 
a vessel is registered under its law 
and to requests for permission made 
pursuant to the provisions in that 
paragraph. At the time of adhering to the 
Convention, each Party shall designate 
an authority to receive and respond 
to such requests. The authority 
designated by each Party for this 
purpose shall be notified through the 
Secretary-General to all other 
Parties within one month of the 
designation. 
5. Where evidence of illicit traffic 
is found, the Party having custody of 
the vessel shall take appropriate 
action with respect to the vessel and 
persons on board, in accordance 
with: 
( a) Its own judicial requirements if the 
vessel is registered under its lawsj or 
(b) Existing bilateral treaties, where 
applicable, or any agreement or 
arrangement otherwise reached at the 
time of seizure with the Party of registry. 
6. The right to challenge the nature or 
effect of the agreement or arrangement 
referred to in paragraph 5 (b) of this article 
shall rest exclusively with the Party of 
registry. 
7. The Parties shall consider enter-
ing into bilateral and regional 
agreements to carry out, or to 
enhance the effectiveness of, the 
provisions of this article. 
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5. Wh,ere evidence of illicit traffic 
is found, the Party having custody of 
the vessel shall take appropriate 
action with respect to the vessel and 
persons on board, in accordance with 
treaties, where applicable, or any 
prior agreement or arrangement 
otherwise reached with the flag State. 
6. A Party which has taken any action 
contemplated in this article shall promptly 
inform the flag State concerned of the 
results of that action. 
7. The Parties shall consider enter-
ing into bilateral and regional 
agreements to carry out, or to 
enhance the effectiveness of, the 
provisions of this article. 
No change was made in paragraph 7, and only minor changes were made 
in paragraphs 1 and 4. Paragraph 2 was redrafted slightly to include some 
phrases from the original paragraph 3 relating to a vessel that is not displaying 
a flag or markings of registry. Paragraphs 3 and 5 were the most controversial 
provisions. 
As far as paragraph 3 was concerned, it was already mentioned that the 
controversy over the status of the exclusive economic zone, which has plagued 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,l56 was revived 
during the preparation of the draft convention against the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.157 The 1986 Secretariat Draft 
allowed the boarding of a suspected vessel "on the high seas as defined in 
Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. "158 Part 
VII, entitled "High Seas" does not actually define the high seas, but in Article 
86 merely states that it applies "to all parts of the sea that are not included 
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters 
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." At the 
same time, Article 86 makes clear, however, that this provision "does not 
entail any abridgement of the freedoms [of the high seas] enjoyed by all States 
in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with Article 58." Article 58, 
in turn, mentions expressly the freedom of navigation and the applicability 
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in the exclusive economic zone of Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules 
of international law , thus including Articles 92 (exclusive jurisdiction of the 
flag State), 108 (illicit traffic in narcotic drugs), 110 (right of visit) and 111 
(right of hot pursuit ceases "as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial 
sea of its own State or of a third State").159 
To avoid any conflict with respect to the meaning of the "high seas" phrase, 
the United States immediately proposed that the right to board a suspected 
vessel should extend to the whole area "outside the territory and the 
territorial sea of any State," thus including the contiguous zone and the 
exclusive economic zone within the area in which boarding does not require 
the consent of the coastal State. This proposal was without prejudice to the 
requirement of "prior consent of the State of registry. "160 The United States 
proposal was accepted by the Intergovernmental Expert Group, whose draft 
authorized the boarding of a suspected vessel "beyond the external limits of 
the territorial sea of any State." The group also added, at the beginning of 
paragraph 3, the phrase "[ w ]ithout prejudice to any rights provided for under 
general international law. "161 
At the 1988 session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, several 
representatives expressed reservations about paragraph 3. One of them 
proposed redrafting the first phrase to read: "Without prejudice to any rights 
conferred on the coastal State under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea ... " Another one proposed, more elaborately, to revise that 
sentence as follows: "Without prejudice to the right deriving from the rules 
and principles of international law , particularly in the zone contiguous to the 
territorial sea." Alternately, that representative suggested a new paragraph 
3 reading: "The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not affect the 
rights which the coastal State may exercise, in conformity with international 
law, in the zone contiguous to its territorial sea." Other representatives 
pointed out that the text adopted by the Expert Group "could imply that 
third States would be given certain rights in the area between 12 and 200 
miles (Exclusive Economic Zone) which were not contemplated in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea." They argued, therefore, for restoring 
the original phraseology proposed by the Secretariat. In response, one 
representative supported the language proposed by the Expert Group on the 
ground that the International Maritime Organization, when faced with a 
similar issue in drafting the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,162 decided also to use a phrase 
referring to jurisdiction "beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea. "163 
Other issues were also raised. One representative, taking into account 
Article 107 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, suggested that "a search 
or seizure may be effected only by a ship and/or aircraft which was clearly 
marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to 
undertake such activities. "164 Another representative commented on 
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paragraph 5, according to which, where evidence of illicit traffic is found, 
"the Party having custody of the vessel shall take appropriate action." He 
pointed out that the notion of" custody of the vessel" covered a legal situation 
not contemplated by the draft convention, and proposed that the main part 
of the sentence be simplified to read: "the Party which has intercepted a vessel 
pursuant to paragraph 3 shall take appropriate action with respect to the vessel 
and persons on board, in accordance with treaties or with any prior agreement 
or arrangement reached with the flag State. "165 It may be noted that this text 
and the Commission's 1988 version differ here from the 1986 text by 
emphasizing the need for a "prior" agreement or arrangement, thus coming 
closer to Article 108 of the Convention on the Law of the Seas which allows 
measures going beyond a visit to verify the ship's right to fly its flag only 
"where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by a treaty." Two 
steps seem to be thus required: a prior agreement (under paragraph 7) 
establishing the means for obtaining permission allowing a foreign authority 
to go beyond a visit and to search or seize a ship; and an actual grant of 
approval for a particular action, Le., to search the ship only, or to search 
and, if evidence of illicit traffic is found, to seize that evidence (and transmit 
it to the flag State for further action), or to seize the ship and arrest the persons 
engaged in illicit traffic. 
Several representatives, by analogy to Articles 106 and 110, paragraph 3, 
of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, proposed that a new paragraph 
should be inserted in Article 12 to guarantee compensation for vessels that 
were subjected to unjustified search measures, to be paid by the State that 
organized the search and determined its scope. Although the flag State had 
granted its approval for a search, it should not bear responsibility as its 
permission was dependent on the information provided by the State requesting 
a search.166 
Finally, one more general comment was made. One representative stressed 
that it should be stipulated in the preamble to the Convention that the 
measures envisaged in the Convention "must be consistent with human rights, 
respect the traditions and customs of national or regional groups and protect 
the environment. " He also proposed that the Convention should indicate that 
"international co-operation, whether bilateral or multilateral, should develop 
free of pressures of any kind. "167 
At the end of the debate, several representatives expressed the following 
conclusions: that Article 12 provided "a workable mechanism to facilitate 
international co-operation against illicit traffic on the high seas;" that it "took 
into account the need not to interfere with legitimate rights of passage;" that, 
by requiring "the consent of the flag State priO! to intervention, [it] preserved 
the important principle of flag State responsibility;" and that, in spite of the 
difficulties faced by some States, the article reflected the compromise reached 
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by the Expert Group, which merited consolidation by the Plenipotentiary 
Conference.t68 
Without making any changes itself, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
decided to forward draft Article 12 to the Plenipotentiary Conference "for 
appropriate consideration. "169 
On the Commission's recommendation,11o the Economic and Social Council 
decided to convene a further group of experts to review the outstanding issues, 
and to convene thereafter a plenipotentiary conference to complete the 
negotiations and adopt the final version of the Convention.l71 
The United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances met in Vienna 
from November 25 to December 20, 1988. The final text was adopted by 
consensus, without vote, on December 19, 1988, and 43 of the 106 States 
participating in the Conference signed it on December 20. The signatory states 
ranged from Afghanistan to Zaire, including China, the United Kingdom and 
the United States; France and the Soviet Union were not, however, among 
the original signatories.172 The 35 substantive articles of the Convention 
impose upon the parties an obligation to take specific law enforcement 
measures to improve their ability to deal more effectively with various aspects 
of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs having an international dimension (Article 
2).173 In the preamble to the Convention, the parties recognize that "the illicit 
traffic is an international activity, the suppression of which demands urgent 
attention and highest priority;" and express, in particular, their determination 
"to improve international cooperation in the suppression of illicit traffic by 
" sea. 
The final text, as revised by the May 1988 Review Group174 and the 
Conference, deals with maritime interdiction in Article 17; in addition, 
certain jurisdictional aspects are dealt with in Article 4(1)(b)(ii). 
The final text of Article 17 reads as follows: 
1. The Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic 
by sea, in conformity with the international law of the sea. 
2. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel flying its flag or not 
displaying a flag or marks of registry is engaged in illicit traffic may request the assistance 
of other Parties in suppressing its use for that purpose. The Parties so requested shall 
render such assistance within the means available to them. 
3. A Party which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom 
of navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying 
marks of registry of another Party is engaged in illicit traffic may so notify the flag 
State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from 
the flag State to take appropriate measures in regard to that vessel. 
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 or in accordance with treaties in force between them 
or in accordance with any agreement or arrangement otherwise reached between those 
Parties, the flag State may authorize the requesting State to, inter alia: 
(a) Board the vessel; 
(b) Search the vessel; 
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(c) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with 
respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board. 
5. Where action is taken pursuant to this article, the Parties concerned shall take due 
account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel 
and the cargo or to prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or 
any other interested State. 
6. The flag State may, consistent with its obligations in paragraph 1 of this article, 
subject its authorization to conditions to be mutually agreed between it and the 
requesting Party, including conditions relating to responsibility. 
7. For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article, a Party shall respond 
expeditiously to a request from another Party to determine whether a vessel that is 
flying its flag is entitled to do so, and to requests for authorization made pursuant to 
paragraph 3. At the time of becoming a Party to this Convention, each Party shall 
designate an authority or, when necessary, authorities to receive and respond to such 
requests. Such designation shall be notified through the Secretary-General to all other 
Parties within one month of the designation. 
8. A Party which has taken action in accordance with this article shall promptly inform 
the flag State concerned of the results of that action. 
9. The Parties shall consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or 
arrangements to carry out, or to enhance the effectiveness of, the provisions of this 
article. 
10. Action pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article shall be carried out only by warships 
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being 
on government service and authorized to that effect. 
11. Any action taken in accordance with this article shall take due account of the need 
not to interfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction 
of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea. 
The next text is an amalgamation of the previous drafts, using some 
language of both the 1986 Secretariat text and that of the earlier Review 
Group, which the Commission on Narcotic Drugs forwarded to the 
Conference,175 with certain changes and several additions. In particular, two 
references were added to the "international law of the sea," it being generally 
understood, and expressly stated by the United States delegation, that these 
references relate to international customary law, as reflected in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus paragraph 1 follows 
clearly Article 108(1) of that Convention, and paragraph 2 is based on its 
Article 108(2), and, following recent practice, expands the right to request 
assistance to include the case of illicit traffic by stateless vessels. It is also 
necessary to note that new paragraph 11 requires that any interdiction action 
"shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or affect the rights 
and obligations of the coastal States in accordance with international law," 
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which have been considerably broadened by the 1982 Convention. The United 
States delegation made clear, however, during the negotiations that this 
paragraph refers only to those situations in which a coastal state has generally 
recognized rights beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, as in the case 
of hot pursuit in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas, and the 
right to take action in the contiguous zone for the limited purposes recognized 
in Article 33 of the LOS Convention. 
Paragraphs 3-6 expand considerably the text contained in earlier drafts and 
define more clearly the respective rights of the flag state and of the state 
wishing to search a foreign ship. A state having reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a vessel flying the flag of another state is engaged in illicit drug traffic 
may take three steps: (a) notify the flag state so that this state itself may take 
the necessary action; (b) request confirmation of registry; and (c) if registry 
is confirmed, request authorization from the flag state to "take appropriate 
measures in regard to that vessel." It is thus made clear that, once it is 
confirmed that the vessel is actually entitled to fly the flag of another state, 
no action can be taken against the vessel without express authorization of 
the flag state. 
The authorization can be made directly "pursuant to this article" of the 
1988 Convention, and in such case no additional agreement or arrangement 
is required. The Convention encourages the parties, however, to enter into 
bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements to carry out the provisions 
of this article (paragraph 9); and the United States has already started to 
conclude such agreements.176 It is not clear what is meant by "arrangements;" 
it probably means exchanges of notes or other executive agreements not 
requiring ratification, but does not include informal ad hoc agreements reached 
by telephone at the time of a request for authorization. 
Whether or not there is an agreement or arrangement, the flag state has 
several choices. In the first place, it may authorize the requesting state only 
to board the vessel (e.g., to ascertain the registration); or it may authorize 
a search of the vessel; or, if that search finds evidence of involvement in illicit 
traffic, the flag state may authorize the requesting state to "take appropriate 
action with respect to the vessel, persons and cargo on board" (paragraph 
4). In the second place, the flag state may, consistent with its obligation to 
"cooperate to the fullest extent" (paragraph 1), "subject its authorization 
to conditions to be mutually agreed" by the two states concerned. If the 
requesting state is not able or willing to comply with those conditions, the 
authorization can be denied. One of the conditions may be that the requesting 
state should agree to be responsible for any damage caused by its action against 
the vessel (paragraph 6). This may be onerous, as the Convention also provides 
that in any action to be taken under this article, the requesting state must 
"take due account of the need not to endanger the safety of life at sea, the 
security of the vessel and the cargo." More broadly, it shall not "prejudice 
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the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other interested 
State" (paragraph 5). 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 reflect the prior drafts, with only minor changes. 
Paragraphs 9 and 11 have already been discussed above. In accordance with 
the new paragraph 10, action under this Article can be taken only by "warships 
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable 
as being on government service and authorized to that effect. " This provision 
reflects several articles of the 1982 LOS Convention.1n 
By thus codifying the rules on interdiction of foreign vessels, the 
Conference took an important step which would bring the campaign against 
illicit drugs to a point beyond that ever reached by the crusade against slave 
trade. Whether this step will endanger the freedom of the high seas will 
depend on the interpretation of the provisions relating to the obligation 
J 
requiring the prior consent of the flag state, not merely in a particular case, 
under pressure of the circumstances, but through a properly ratified, bilateral 
or multilateral agreement, containing proper safeguards against abuse.178 In 
the 1920s it proved possible for the United States to conclude sixteen such 
agreements in order to combat liquor traffic.179 Perhaps it may be possible 
to conclude agreements similar to the one made with the United Kingdom 
in 1981,180 which would permit the United States-in the words of paragraph 
9 of Article 17 of the Convention-"to carry out, or to enhance the 
effectiveness of, the provision of [ that] article." Only that kind of action 
would maintain the integrity of Article 110 of the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, and would protect the United States and its Navy against the 
disintegration of the concept of the freedom of the high seas, on which the 
security of the United States depends.181 
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